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Randomised Experiments and the Evaluation 
of Innovative Placement Schemes 
for the Unemployed
*
Marc Ferracci**, Florine Martin***
Improving counselling and placement schemes for the unemployed is a key 
element of active labour-market policies. While a number of academic papers 
have focussed on jobseeker-centred schemes, we here evaluate new innovative 
methods that aim to improve caseworker efficiency. Two different treatments 
are evaluated via randomised experiments. The first provides caseworkers 
with help in the organization of their time, by allowing them to focus on a 
limited number of jobseekers. The second consists in increasing the human 
resources that are devoted to collecting job offers and matching them to job-
seekers. The results show that both schemes raise the average exit rate out of 
unemployment, but that this positive effect is not systematic, as it varies with 
the individual characteristics of the unemployed. This raises the issue of the 
spillovers that are generated by such schemes.
The budgets devoted to labour-market policies are not inexhaustible. In 2012, the amount of money allocated by the Budget Law to the programme “Work and 
Employment” was 11% lower than that in 2011, at a total of 10.2 billion euros. In 
addition, the subsidies granted to the Pôle emploi (the Public Placement Operator) 
remained at their 2010 and 2011 levels even though there were substantially more 
jobseekers to be helped.1 These budget restrictions accentuate, if it was necessary 
1. At the end of June 2012, the statistics from Job Centres provided by the Direction de l’animation de la recherche, 
des études et des statistiques (Department for the Coordination of Research, Studies and Statistics – DARES) revealed 
a rise of 6.9% in the number of registered jobseekers on a year-to-year basis (DARES, 2012).
* Translation: Andrew Clark.
** Université de Nantes, Laboratoire d’économie et de management de Nantes-Atlantique (LEMNA), Centre de 
recherches en économie et statistiques (Crest-ENSAE), Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques 
publiques (LIEPP-Sciences Po), Chaire de sécurisation des parcours professionnels; marc.ferracci@ensae.fr
*** Équipe de recherche sur l’utilisation des données individuelles en lien avec la théorie économique (Érudite), 
Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée; Sodie; florine.martin@sodie.com 
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to do so, the need for the systematic evaluation of the policies designed to help the 
unemployed. The current constraints force us to come up with methods that increase 
the efficiency of placement schemes without increasing the amount spent.
In this context, the current article presents the results of a field experiment aimed 
at increasing the efficiency of the help given to the unemployed, emphasizing the 
role of the methods used by caseworkers rather than the details of the programme 
itself (the frequency of interviews with the unemployed, for example). Two innovative 
schemes are tested using original data collected by a Private Placement Operator, 
Sodie, working for the Pôle emploi. Compared to the existing work on evaluation 
in France and elsewhere, the particularity of these schemes consists in the targeting 
of placement caseworkers themselves, rather than jobseekers. The first scheme aims 
to help caseworkers better organize their work time, by concentrating from time to 
time their effort on a small number of jobseekers. The second increases the resources 
dedicated to the search for job offers and the positioning of candidates regarding 
these offers. The results show that both mechanisms may increase the exit rate from 
unemployment, but that this does not hold for all types of jobseekers. This raises the 
question of the existence of spillover effects from such schemes.
Existing Literature
There are by now a number of quantitative evaluations of the effect of enhanced 
job-search programmes for the unemployed, as compared to the standard counselling 
they receive in this respect. In France, since the beginning of the 2000s, and even 
more so since the constitutional reform of 28 March 2003 which authorised random 
experiments by local authorities, this type of evaluation has grown rapidly. In their meta-
analysis of labour-market policies, David CARD, Jochen KLUVE and Andrea WEBER 
(2010) conclude that job-search counselling policies are generally more effective than 
subsidised employment programmes in the public sector, and produce faster results 
than do training programmes. A number of pieces of work on French data have revealed 
a positive effect of job-search counselling on job-finding by the unemployed. Bruno 
CRÉPON, Muriel DEJEMEPPE and Marc GURGAND (2005) use historical data from the 
French Public Employment Agency (Agence nationale pour l’emploi – ANPE) to 
analyse the effects of a variety of programmes on both the return to work and the 
duration of the subsequent job. There are many evaluations of this kind in other coun-
tries which have produced broadly consistent results. Recently, Pathric HÄGGLUND 
(2009) noted, using an experimental approach in Swedish data, the positive effect of 
a counselling programme in reducing the length of the unemployment spell. Equally, 
Richard BLUNDELL and co-authors (2004) evaluate a counselling programme targeted at 
youth unemployment in the UK, the New Deal for the Young Unemployed programme, 
and find positive results. The French results in this context are thus in line with those 
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found in other countries:2 counselling programmes increase the job-finding rate of 
the unemployed, regardless of the type of unemployed or of the agency providing the 
programme.
These kinds of programmes are costly, however, and the costs have to be compared 
to the ensuing benefits.3 Recent work has thus attempted to establish the cost-benefit 
ratio of counselling programmes for the unemployed. One example is CRÉPON and 
co-authors (2011) with respect to a programme run by a private placement operator 
aimed at the recipients of the French minimum welfare payment that is provided to 
those who are not entitled to unemployment benefits (Revenu minimum d’insertion 
– RMI). While their results do show a positive impact of this programme in terms of 
recipients’ return to work and benefit receipt, they conclude that the programme is not 
always profitable in the sense that the value of the benefits does not outweigh the costs. 
HAINMUELLER et al. (2011) come to a contrasting conclusion in a different context. In 
German data, the reduction in caseworkers’ caseload is found to reduce the duration 
of unemployment, due to a rise in both the penalties applied to the unemployed (as 
caseworkers now have more time to analyse each individual case) and the number of 
jobs proposed to the unemployed under this scheme. Contrary to CRÉPON et al. (2011), 
the authors conclude that the long-run cost of hiring more caseworkers is outweighed 
by the positive effects of a smaller caseload.
While these programmes generally improve the placement of the unemployed, it 
does not then follow that greater resources devoted to such programmes will automati-
cally produce a favourable cost-benefit figure. As such, we should consider, either at 
the fringe or the heart of the Public Employment Agency, the introduction of alternative 
placement schemes that are potentially more efficient. This search for efficiency has 
led to an increasing use of outsourced services that compete for the placement of 
the unemployed, with private providers sometimes being argued to be more reactive 
and innovative in their counselling activities. While the outsourcing of placement 
services is now widespread in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) countries, France has only relatively recently considered taken this 
route, starting in the early 2000s.
A number of evaluations have specifically considered the outcomes of private 
providers compared to those of the Public Employment Agency. CRÉPON et al. (2011), 
already cited above, use double-blind randomisation to show that an intensified coun-
selling programme for the young unemployed with qualifications, carried out by an 
external service provider (an association, which has a particular legal status, or a private 
placement operator), produced quicker transitions to lasting jobs. Luc BEHAGHEL and 
co-authors (2012) appeal to a randomised trial and obtain similar results: intensified 
2. See FERRACCI (2007) for a review of the literature on the efficiency of reforms to the public employment agency.
3. This is particularly the case as both theoretical and empirical work on the outsourcing of public services has 
underlined that private operators act in order to maximise their profit, given the financial incentives under which they 
operate. In an extension of their evaluation, BEHAGHEL et al. (2012) consider the determinants of private-operator 
efficiency, and conclude that financial incentives play a key role.
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counselling programmes for the unemployed, provided by a private operator or a 
specific unit of the ANPE (Cap vers l’entreprise – CVE), improve the employment 
prospects of recipients, whether they receive unemployment benefits or not. In addition, 
BEHAGHEL et al. (2012) emphasize that the effect of the programme run by the CVE is 
larger and comes about more quickly than that of the private provider.
The experiment carried out by BEHAGHEL et al. (2012) was accompanied by 
qualitative interviews with those involved in administering the programme (the 
private operator and the CVE) and telephone interviews with a representative sample 
of jobseekers who received either intensified counselling or the normal counselling 
programme (GRATADOUR, LE BARBANCHON, 2009; CAPELIER, MIZRAHI, 2008). The 
results from this qualitative research revealed the broad similarities between the inten-
sified programmes proposed by the private operator and the CVE, even though there 
were some differences. The CVE proposed more employment offers to jobseekers than 
did the private operator, while the latter concentrated more on help with job search. 
However, the isolation of the qualitative research from the quantitative evaluation 
makes it difficult to see how these different practices affected jobseekers’ return to 
work. The data in BEHAGHEL et al. (2012) does not then allow us to determine which 
particular methods used by either the private provider or the CVE had a positive impact 
on job finding. Equally, the qualitative evaluation was not carried out in the traditional 
framework of a randomised control trial, which, under certain conditions, allows causal 
relationships to be established. These limitations helped inspire the evaluation work 
that we describe in the current article.
Overall then, the results in the existing literature do not allow us to evaluate the 
impact of innovative placement schemes by the caseworkers who are responsible for 
finding jobs for the unemployed. In particular, there is no work looking at the effect 
of caseworkers’ better understanding of the labour market in order to improve the 
job offers that are proposed to the unemployed. However, field work has suggested 
that practices in terms of placement schemes for the unemployed vary widely, and 
in particular among private operators (DIVAY, 2010). The aim of the current article 
is to help fill this gap by testing, via a randomised experiment, a number of schemes 
designed to improve caseworker efficiency. We also address the question of the external 
validity of our results, and the possibility of generalising these types of scheme. The 
following section outlines the context in which our analysis took place, and then the 
details of the experimental scheme and the resulting data.
2015 Special Edition – Travail et Emploi –  69
Evaluation of Innovative Placement Schemes
The Context of the Experimental Evaluation
The Pôle Emploi and Sodie
Sodie4 is part of the Alpha Group, which is involved in the entire employment 
process via Sécafi5 and Sémaphores.6 Sodie was initially active, in the 1980s, in the 
retraining of workers from the Steel industry and has since worked on regional revi-
talisation programmes and the redeployment of workers in a range of industries and 
occupations. It is today a human resources service and consultancy company that is 
specialised in labour-market transitions.
In April 2009, Sodie submitted a bid to the tender announced by the Public 
Employment Agency for measures aiming to place two particular groups of job-
seekers: those in the “Trajectoire Emploi” measure (which we will subsequently call 
TRAJECTOIRE) directed at those who are the most detached from the labour market,7 
and in the “Licenciés économiques” measure (subsequently called LIEC) targeted at 
the unemployed who had been laid-off and who had signed a Personalised Retraining 
Convention (Convention de reclassement personnalisée – CRP) or a Professional 
Transition Contract (Contrat de transition professionnelle – CTP).8
In addition to the target groups, the TRAJECTOIRE and LIEC measures dif-
fered in two other ways: the duration of the programme proposed to beneficiaries 
(six months for TRAJECTOIRE, but a maximum of twelve months for LIEC) and 
the outcomes accepted by the Public Employment Agency as authorising the ending 
of the treatment programme. In the TRAJECTOIRE measures, these outcomes were 
only permanent employment or a temporary contract of at least six months’ duration, 
while in the LIEC measure they also included long-duration training or the creation 
(or reopening) of a firm.
The types of successful outcomes recognised by the Public Employment Agency 
are important, to the extent that they determine whether Sodie receives the variable 
component of its payment. The payment schedule for the private provider in this 
programme is as follows: 50% of the amount is paid when the individual treatment 
4. For more information, see http://www.sodie.com/.
5. A consultancy group for Works Councils, Hygiene, Safety and Work Conditions Committees and Trade Unions.
6. A consultancy group for firms and local regions in the fields of local economic development, training and 
employment, auditing, efficiency and project management (in terms of housing, taxation etc.).
7. The individuals the most detached from the labour market were defined in the tender document as jobseekers:  
– who do not have any part-time activity;  
– who require ongoing support in their job search;  
– who face difficulty in finding a job and want a permanent position;  
– who live in depressed employment areas;  
– who are entering the labour market for the first time.
8. As over the duration of the programme, the Job Centre was not able, in some areas, to supply Sodie with sufficient 
jobseekers who had been laid off to attain the minima required in the contract, the LIEC measures were extended to 
jobseekers laid off on economic grounds, but who had not necessarily signed a CRP or CTP, and were hence only 
entitled to the general regime of counselling and unemployment benefits.
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programme starts, 25% if the individual is placed (but only 10% if this placement is in 
a training programme) and another 25% if the placement job lasts at least six months 
(ditto for the creation/reopening of a firm).9 Payment of the variable component is 
conditional on proof of placement and duration being supplied to the Pôle emploi.
The tender was split up into a number of different geographical areas, and 
Sodie was the successful bidder in 14 of these (representing 22% of the total): Est 
francilien (Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne), Centre and Pas-de-Calais for the 
TRAJECTOIRE measures; Nord-Pas-de-Calais (two areas), the Île-de-France region 
other than Paris (three areas), Rhône-Alpes (two areas), Poitou-Charentes, Burgundy, 
Brittany and Lorraine for the LIEC measures.
The placement programme ran for two years starting in September 2009, with 
Sodie being involved with over 45,000 jobseekers in the LIEC programme and almost 
20,000 in the TRAJECTOIRE programme. The scale of the jobseeker-placement 
programme resulted in Sodie opening 110 new sites in the regions concerned and 
recruiting 100 new employees.
The size of the programme, the company’s willingness to innovate, and the contri-
butions and limits of the private operator vs. CVE evaluation noted above led Sodie’s 
Management to engage in an autonomous programme of analysis and evaluation. The 
aim was to develop methods that would allow the caseworkers working with jobseekers 
(who Sodie calls Human Resources Caseworkers – RH) to evaluate the results of their 
work and consequently to improve their work methods. To this end an “Analysis and 
Evaluation Group” of staff from Groupe Alpha (of which Sodie is part) was established: 
this consisted of members of Sodie’s Management and Operational teams (the project 
Director, the project supervisor and the RH caseworker), members of the group’s 
analysis and forecasting centre, the manager of the computer system dealing with the 
data on jobseekers and job offers, as well as academics. This evaluation by Sodie led to 
a number of practical conclusions being drawn, which will be discussed in detail below.
Profiling, Experimentation, Fieldwork: 
the Three-Point Evaluation of Sodie’s Pôle Emploi Programme
The evaluation of Sodie’s Pôle emploi programme consisted of three distinct 
parts.10 First, the individual and career characteristics of the jobseekers concerned 
were recorded and analysed, in order to identify the factors associated with a return 
to work and establish a profiling system. This latter consisted of the estimation of 
9. This type of variable payment schedule is by now the norm for outsourced contracts (FERRACCI, 2007). The schedule 
provides incentives for private operators to perform efficiently, but may also lead to selection issues: caseworkers may 
concentrate their efforts on the jobseekers who are actually the least detached from the labour market.
10. These three components were set out in a letter from the Groupe Alpha’s analysis and forecasting centre: “An OPP 
on the couch. The evaluation of Sodie’s jobseeker placement programme”, La lettre du CEP, No 9, February 2012. This 
is available online (in French): http://www.groupe-alpha.com/data/document/lettre-cep-9-opp-sur-divan15-02-2012.
pdf (accessed 27 May 2016).
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the ex ante probability of finding a job, given their observable characteristics, and 
was designed to provide caseworkers with a decision tool. As a complement to their 
own judgement of the individual in question, profiling allows caseworkers to select 
appropriate measures for each jobseeker in their portfolio. It is important to underline 
that this profiling information was made available to caseworkers only in offices that 
were randomly selected in one of the two schemes evaluated (see the paragraph below 
entitled “Description of the schemes evaluated”).11
Alongside the profiling, two pieces of analysis were carried out: a qualitative 
field survey (see the Box) and a randomised control trial of a number of placement 
11. The use that caseworkers make of this profiling information is interesting in that it allows us to identify any 
cherry-picking behaviour, in which more attention is paid to jobseekers who are less detached from the labour market 
and so increase the firm’s income. The section below on the experimental results will come back to this point.
BOX
Fieldwork Methodology
The fieldwork was carried out over a ten-month period between June 2010 and 
March 2011. It consisted of 35 semi-structured interviews with individuals working for 
Sodie:
– RH caseworkers; 
– RENT caseworkers; 
– RENT co-ordinators; 
– Project supervisors; 
– The management team.
The choice of those interviewed in this qualitative survey should allow recurring issues 
in the workplace to be identified. All of the regions covered by the Pôle emploi programme 
were visited. One site per region was chosen according to a number of criteria in order to 
ensure that the survey covered the outcomes in the following dimensions:
– the measures offered at the site (TRAJECTOIRE, LIEC – CTP or CRP –, or both); 
– dynamic or depressed employment areas1; 
– the size of the site (in terms of the number of jobseekers); 
– whether the site was set up in the local Pôle emploi or not.
These interviews were carried out following a set of guidelines and lasted for an hour 
and a half on average. All interviews were fully transcribed.
The qualitative work consisted of two phases:
–  an exploratory part in order to validate the interview guidelines (three sites visited and 
around ten interviews in June 2010);
–  the subsequent general interviews between September 2010 and March 2011 pro-
ducing 25 more interviews.
1. Employment areas were classified as dynamic or depressed according to the diagnostics of Sodie’s analysis 
group, largely based on Insee (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques) and ANPE data, such 
as the Workforce Requirements survey (Besoins en main-d’œuvre).
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schemes. These two were undertaken in parallel, with the results of the field survey 
allowing the stumbling blocks in the practical implementation of the experiments to 
be identified.12 The fieldwork consisted of a set of observations and semi-structured 
interviews in a sample of Sodie sites that dealt with jobseekers in the context of the 
TRAJECTOIRE and LIEC measures. Interviews were carried out with the project man-
agers and supervisors, the RH caseworkers and the caseworkers who were in charge 
of identifying appropriate job offers in the labour market (known as the conseillers 
relations entreprises - RENT). The aim was twofold. First, to better understand the 
relationship between Sodie’s work organization (the different types of job and how 
tasks were split between them, in particular between the RH and RENT caseworkers, 
the hierarchical links, and the degree of autonomy) and its economic model (billing, the 
establishment of the sites, etc.), and how these two had changed with the Pôle emploi 
programme. Second, to establish how these two affected the placement of jobseekers.
The second analysis was a randomised control trial of a number of schemes 
designed to improve jobseeker placement: this is described in the following sections.
Innovative Placement Scheme Experiments
Description of the Schemes Evaluated
The approach taken by Sodie’s analysis and evaluation group was to first carry 
out a pre-experimental test of three schemes in six sites in the first half of 2010. 
These three schemes resulted from discussions in the analysis and evaluation group 
between academics and those responsible for jobseeker placement in Sodie. This pre-
experimental phase allowed the practical difficulties associated with each scheme to be 
identified and corrected, as far as possible.13 The schemes were a monthly placement 
engagement (the PARI scheme), greater resources for the service that identified job 
offers and matched them to jobseekers (the RENT scheme) and the monthly publication 
of individual RH caseworker performance (the RANK scheme).
Under this last RANK scheme, RH caseworkers were ranked at each site according 
to their placement performance, with the results being sent monthly to all RH case-
workers on the site. No penalty or bonus was associated with this ranking. The idea 
was to motivate caseworkers by allowing them to compare their outcomes to those of 
their peers, and to encourage co-operation and the exchange of good practice between 
those with better and worse performance in the same workgroup. This scheme, that 
was particularly backed by Sodie’s management who wanted to provide performance 
incentives to caseworkers, was not in the end retained in the experimental phase as it 
was introduced over the entire company immediately after the pre-experimental test as 
12. See the paragraph below entitled “Operational difficulties and their solutions”.
13. Ibid.
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a result of its almost-zero cost. Only the PARI and RENT schemes were experimentally 
tested.
The caseworkers in the PARI scheme made a monthly placement engagement with 
respect to the jobseekers in their portfolio (five placements or 10% of their jobseekers), 
which jobseekers were identified by name ex ante. In practice, at the beginning of each 
month, caseworkers selected the jobseekers for whom they made this engagement 
using the computerised monitoring application. This scheme came out of the obser-
vation made by operations supervisors at the sites during the exploratory phase of the 
qualitative survey that caseworkers sometimes had problems with the organization of 
their time, consecrating too much time to jobseekers who were in fact quite capable 
of looking for a job on their own. The PARI scheme was designed to help caseworkers 
take the time each month to review their entire portfolio and identify the jobseekers 
who a priori would be likely to benefit the most from help. Caseworkers could then, 
with the help of the project supervisors, set up their schedules and the initiatives to be 
undertaken for these identified jobseekers, while not forgetting the other jobseekers in 
their portfolio. The person responsible for the coordination of the experiment was in 
charge of collecting and compiling these placement engagements over all of the sites, 
and chasing up, if needs be, caseworkers who did not make their monthly engagements 
on time. The PARI scheme was thus presented as methodological aid for caseworkers, 
aimed at improving their efficiency by helping them organize their time.14
Under the second scheme tested (RENT), greater resources were affected to the 
service that identified job offers and matched them to jobseekers. Four RENT assistants 
were recruited for this purpose over the duration of the experiment, and were set the 
task of identifying job offers uniquely for the sites that were randomly chosen for this 
scheme. These assistants were told to look on the open labour market,15 and identify, 
for a restricted portfolio of jobseekers, relevant job offers from the main available 
sources. In addition, they ensured that CVs were sent off and followed up each of the 
applications sent to firms. As well as canvassing for job offers, the RENT scheme thus 
includes a component regarding the positioning of jobseekers relative to the job offers. 
This increase in resources and improved matching of job offers and jobseekers should 
improve placement performance.16
14. Even though caseworkers were made aware of the issue, this scheme can lead to the cherry-picking of certain 
jobseekers, with those considered to be difficult cases left to one side in favour of those selected for the monthly 
placement engagement. This possibility is however limited by the fact that, as in the RANK scheme, the PARI scheme 
is not associated with any penalty or bonus. The analysis of the empirical results reveals that, in fact, jobseekers who 
were the most detached from the labour market were not put at a disadvantage by the PARI scheme (see the paragraph 
“Results by sub-populations” below).
15. The open labour market is that where all job offers are published, as opposed to the hidden labour market.
16. At Sodie the department identifying appropriate job offers in the labour market (RENT) is organized regionally 
around four job types:
– RENT caseworkers: one per site in the context of the Job Centre programme. This caseworker identifies job offers 
on the hidden labour market by going to meet local firms which have jobs open;
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Data and Outcome Variables
The data used to constitute the test and control groups, and evaluate the schemes, 
come from the internal database used to keep track of jobseekers, called “RHapSodie”. 
The use of an internal database from a placement company is one of the original 
aspects of this experiment. RHapSodie allows caseworkers to enter and visualise 
all of the jobseeker’s individual characteristics: qualifications, career to date, career 
goals, etc. The identified job offers collected by the service also appear in the same 
programme. These are available to the human resources caseworkers who can directly 
match job offers and jobseekers. Caseworkers can also monitor each job application via 
RHapSodie: this shows the data on the help given to and placement of the jobseeker, 
the type of services proposed, meetings or training sessions attended, the exit date 
from the scheme and the type of placement (job, training, creation or reopening of a 
firm).17 Efforts were made to ensure that caseworkers understood the importance of 
entering all appropriate data into the programme.
Our outcome variable is placement in a job lasting at least six months (see above) 
within a certain time after entering one of the two schemes (TRAJECTOIRE or LIEC). 
All jobs lasting at least six months count as positive outcomes here, whether permanent, 
fixed-term or temporary. For the LIEC scheme, long-duration training, of over six 
months and 150 hours, or the creation or reopening of a firm also count. It is important 
to note that in the RHapSodie database, exits to employment or training were only 
billed when the jobseeker brought proof of placement (an employment contract or 
attestation of admission into a training programme, for example). This way of checking 
exits does introduce some uncertainty, as certain jobseekers do not send these attesta-
tions back to Sodie. As such, the exit rates here should be considered with some caution, 
especially when they are compared to work in which placement is orally declared by 
the jobseeker, as in the OPP/CVE evaluation (BEHAGHEL et al., 2012).
Random Allocation and the Comparison of Jobseeker Characteristics
The random draw took place over the 101 Sodie sites that were opened in the 
context of the Pôle emploi programme, spread over eight different regions and 
including participants in the two schemes, TRAJECTOIRE and LIEC. The three sites 
– RENT assistants: again one per site. The assistant may be asked to enter the job offers identified by the RENT 
caseworker into the computerised application, as well as considering the fit between jobs and jobseekers when sending 
off the CVs transferred by the human resources caseworkers and following up on job applications;
– Telecanvassers: these are the individuals who ring firms to collect job offers. The amount of telecanvassing differs 
between sites;
– The RENT co-ordinator manages the service identifying appropriate job offers in each region.
As such, while the RENT department traditionally looked for job offers on the hidden market, the new RENT assistants 
recruited in the context of the Job Centre programme identified jobs only in the open market by consulting the main 
available sources.
17. The data from the Job Centre programme thus offer a number of perspectives for future research beyond the 
analysis in the current paper. The conclusion returns to this point.
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that participated in the pre-experimental phase were excluded from this draw. The 
draw took place over sites, and not jobseekers, for both ethical and practical reasons. 
It seemed difficult to have on the same site jobseekers who would benefit from some 
additional help and those who would not. In addition, the very nature of the schemes 
to be tested rendered differentiation across jobseekers on the same site tricky. The 
experiment was carried out over a ten-month period, between September 2010 and 
June 2011. Sites were randomly assigned to one of three groups: one of the two schemes 
to be tested (PARI and RENT) and the control group. The individual assistants in the 
RENT scheme were also randomly allocated to the different sites that were chosen for 
the RENT scheme. Random allocation by site, rather than by individual, means that 
there are two types of jobseeker at each site: those who are already signed up when 
the experiment started (the stock) and those who entered unemployment after this date 
(the flow). To the extent that these two groups are not comparable with respect to their 
potential duration of unemployment, we estimate different effects for the stock and 
flow groups. In addition, to ensure a degree of homogeneity by site size in the three 
different groups above, sites were stratified by size before the draw took place. Sites 
were split up into 34 lots of three sites of similar size, and the allocation into groups 
(PARI, RENT and control) took place within each lot.
The objective of this random draw was to constitute two populations of jobseekers 
in the TRAJECTOIRE and LIEC groups who were similar in terms of their individual 
characteristics, and so who only differed in terms of the placement schemes that they 
were offered. Tables 1 and 2 present some descriptive statistics suggesting that this goal 
was reached, for the stock and flow populations respectively. For each measure in the 
table, the first three columns show the means for a number of individual characteristics in 
the RENT, PARI and control groups. With the individuals in these three columns having 
been allocated randomly, we want to be sure that their mean characteristics are similar. 
There are certainly occasional differences, but these are small and only rarely significant 
(the stars in the following columns of the table indicate statistical significance). The 
three experimental groups thus have similar observable characteristics. We can extend 
this notion of similarity: if the random allocation rendered the groups similar in terms 
of their observable characteristics (such as jobseeker age and education), we have good 
reasons to believe that they are also similar regarding their unobservable characteristics 
that may play a role in their placement (like their motivation and social network).
Beyond the validation of the experimental approach of the comparison of means, 
Tables 1 and 2 also inform us about the characteristics of the individuals in the 
TRAJECTOIRE and LIEC measures. Mechanically, individuals in the TRAJECTOIRE 
measure have characteristics which make their placement more difficult. These are 
summarised in an individual propensity score showing the probability of being in a 
job one year after having entered unemployment. This score comes from the profiling 
model developed by Sodie in the context of the evaluation of the Pôle emploi pro-
gramme. As expected, the average score is lower (around 0.15) for individuals in the 
TRAJECTOIRE measure than for those in the LIEC measure (around 0.35).
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TABLE 1 –  Mean Individual Characteristics in the Experimental Groups – Stock Population





(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Female 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.40 0.41 *
Age < 35 0.33 0.34 0.38 * * 0.39 0.38 0.39
Single 0.38 0.37 0.40 * 0.21 0.21 0.22
French 0.79 0.84 0.85 * 0.94 0.93 0.93
No qualifications 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.08
Driving licence 0.52 0.55 0.56 * 0.82 0.80 0.81
Social-professional group: 
employee 0.39 0.41 0.41 * 0.45 0.43 0.44
Last unemployment period 
< 100 days 0.28 0.30 0.31 * 0.20 0.22 0.21 *
Salary requested is the 
minimum wage 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.10 0.11 0.11
Last contract was permanent 0.24 0.30 0.28 * 0.81 0.80 0.84 *
Reconversion° 0.55 0.50 0.51 * * 0.49 0.48 0.48 *
Individual score°° 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.32 0.31 0.32
Site size°°° 398 441 481 ** ** 398 441 481 ** **
Number of individuals 3,515 1,576 5,382 3,446 4,963 4,739
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
° The reconversion variable is a dummy for the ROME (Répertoire opérationnel des métiers et des emplois) code of the desired job 
being different from that of the previous job.
°° The individual score is calculated by regressing employment status one year after entering unemployment on a set of individual 
characteristics
°°° Site size is the number of individuals on each site, across all different measures. We thus ensure that the three groups consist of 
similarly-sized sites.
Source: Sodie.
Operational Difficulties and their Solutions
The experiment ran into a number of operational difficulties, and a number of 
changes had to be made compared to the initial scientific protocol and methodology. 
First, regarding the randomisation, a number of sites were excluded from the exper-
iment after the initial draw. Three as they decided to introduce, during the experimental 
period, their own version of the RENT scheme even though they had been allocated 
to either the control or the PARI group.
A number of operational difficulties also came to light with respect to the 
implementation of the two experimental schemes. With respect to the increase in the 
human resources of the RENT service, the four new assistants were only recruited 
in October 2010, one month after the start of the experiment, and the duration of the 
learning phase regarding the search for job offers and the positioning of candidates 
differed between assistants. In addition, given the turnover in the team, in some periods 
(notably May and June), there were only three assistants instead of four. During these 
periods the sites allocated to the missing assistant were reallocated to her colleagues. 
Another problem encountered in the RENT scheme required the priority treatment of 
some jobseekers. At the start of the experiment, the RENT assistants were asked to 
2015 Special Edition – Travail et Emploi –  77
Evaluation of Innovative Placement Schemes
identify job offers for all the jobseekers at their sites who had a CV available. Given 
the large number of jobseekers, and the frequent refusal of some jobseekers to apply 
for the jobs offered,18 it was decided that the four RENT assistants should concentrate 
their efforts on the jobseekers who were the most detached from the labour market (in 
the TRAJECTOIRE group) and individuals who were at the end of their CTP/CRP, 
who were more likely to accept to apply for a job. The refusal to apply for jobs fell 
after this reorientation, making the team’s work more effective.
There were also changes in the PARI scheme during the experiment, with profiling 
information on jobseekers being made available to caseworkers in February 2011. This 
decision tool was designed to help caseworkers with their choice of candidate, but also 
revealed how the jobseeker candidates were selected. Profiling information was sup-
plied in two phases in order to see how behaviour changed: in February and March 2011, 
this information was given to caseworkers in half of the PARI sites, and only starting in 
April 2011 did all caseworkers in PARI sites benefit from this information.
18. For the laid-off who are at the beginning of their CRP/CTP, this refusal to apply for the jobs proposed by the 
RENT assistants may reflect that unemployment benefits are fairly high, at 80% of last gross wages, so that a number 
of these laid-off unemployed may have taken a wait-and-see attitude.
TABLE 2 –  Mean Individual Characteristics in the Experimental Groups – Flow Population





(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Female 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.42
Age < 35 0.41 0.40 0.38 * 0.42 0.42 0.41
Single 0.39 0.36 0.38 * 0.21 0.21 0.22
French 0.90 0.91 0.93 * 0.95 0.94 0.94
No qualifications 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 *
Driving licence 0.65 0.64 0.62 * 0.85 0.86 0.85
Social-professional group: 
employee 0.43 0.45 0.46 * 0.45 0.43 0.44
Last unemployment period 
< 100 days 0.36 0.35 0.33 * 0.21 0.20 0.19 *
Salary requested is the 
minimum wage 0.33 0.34 0.32 * 0.08 0.08 0.09
Last contract was permanent 0.31 0.32 0.33 * 0.93 0.92 0.92 *
Reconversion° 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.48 *
Individual score°° 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.37 0.37 0.37
Site size°°° 283 380 402 ** 283 380 402 **
Number of individuals 1,994 1,719 3,112 2,987 3,888 4,244
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
° The reconversion variable is a dummy for the ROME (Répertoire opérationnel des métiers et des emplois) code of the desired job 
being different from that of the previous job.
°° The individual score is calculated by regressing employment status one year after entering unemployment on a set of individual 
characteristics.
°°° Site size is the number of individuals on each site, across all different measures.
Source: Sodie.
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Results
Treatment Effect and Spillovers in the Experimental Sites
The outcome measure for each scheme is calculated over all individuals in the 
treated sites, in order to take any spillovers, positive or negative, into account. Being a 
jobseeker at a RENT site does not necessarily mean that the individual will personally 
be supported by the new team. However, the information about available jobs given 
to identified jobseekers may well be passed on to others whose CV was not sent off in 
an application to this job by the RENT assistants. This is a positive spillover, but it is 
also possible to imagine negative spillovers. These could pertain in the PARI scheme 
if caseworkers select certain jobseekers from their portfolio for their (temporarily) 
undivided attention, to the detriment of the jobseekers who were not selected. These 
types of spillovers justify the use of outcomes for all jobseekers at the site to evaluate 
the schemes, and not just those who were chosen by caseworkers in the PARI scheme 
or by the assistants in the RENT scheme.
The evaluation was carried out for the two groups, TRAJECTOIRE and LIEC, 
and for the stock and flow unemployed. The stock unemployed are those who were 
in one of the two groups prior to the start of the experiment in September 2010, while 
the flow unemployed joined one of the two groups during the experiment, between 
September 2010 and June 2011. The separate analysis of the outcomes in terms of 
lasting jobs for the stock and flow unemployed allows the evaluation of treatment 
efficacity for jobseekers who benefit from the start of their unemployment period (for 
example, the flow unemployed who were laid-off) and jobseekers who had already 
benefited from help before the start of the experiment (for example, jobseekers in the 
stock TRAJECTOIRE group).
Results by Sub-Populations
Table 3 shows the impact of the RENT and PARI schemes on the probability of 
leaving unemployment for a job or training for the LIEC group. The figures in parentheses 
indicate the average exit rate for the population under consideration.19 The estimated 
coefficients thus reflect the percentage-point effect on this exit rate of the schemes. 
Both schemes have a positive effect for the flow unemployed, regardless of the time 
period considered, with the effect size being significant and somewhat larger for the 
PARI scheme. This latter increases the probability of leaving unemployment for a job 
or training by six percentage points 12 months after joining the scheme (the analogous 
figure for the rent scheme is five percentage points). The results are more mixed for the 
19. It should be remembered that these exit rates are conditional on the caseworkers obtaining proof of placement 
and duration, and are thus not directly comparable to the rates obtained from jobseekers themselves during telephone 
interviews in other evaluations.
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stock unemployed, with the RENT scheme only having a positive impact at six months, 
and the estimated coefficients for the PARI scheme always being insignificant.
Table 4 presents the impact of the two schemes on the exit rate for those in the 
TRAJECTOIRE group. Here, the RENT scheme is always associated with positive 
outcomes for the flow unemployed. The notable result here is that the effect of PARI in 
this group is now insignificant at three months and significantly negative at six months 
(two percentage points lower).20 Neither scheme produces significant effects for the 
stock TRAJECTOIRE group, regardless of the time horizon under consideration. The 
negative impact of PARI here may reflect a negative spillover, similar to those recently 
found for other active labour-market policies:21 the PARI scheme may involve less 
effort being expended on non-selected jobseekers. It is possible that this reduced 
attention mattered less in the LIEC population, which is made up of individuals who 
are on average less detached from the labour market and so more autonomous in terms 
of job search. On the contrary, not being selected as part of the monthly placement 
engagement could have more serious effects for individuals in the TRAJECTOIRE 
population, as they likely require more attention than do the LIEC jobseekers.
20. Given that treatment in the TRAJECTOIRE group is limited to six months, we do not present a twelve-month exit 
rate here.
21. FERRACCI and co-authors (2014) use data from the national Assedic database to show that a rise in the number 
of trained unemployed in a local labour market reduces the exit rate for the unemployed without training, probably 
reflecting displacement. A similar result is found for counselling programmes for the unemployed in the experiment 
in CRÉPON et al., 2013.
TABLE 3 –  The Impact of the Schemes on the Probability of Leaving Unemployment for Work, 
the Creation or Reopening of a Firm, or Training. Linear Probability Models
° Given the outcome variable, it should be noted that the stock population is likely heterogeneous, as it consists of individuals who 
were helped for between 0 and 3 months for the 3-month exit rate, and between 0 and 12 months for that at 12 months. This makes the 
comparison with the flow results more difficult.
Notes: *, **, *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. The standard errors are clustered at the site level.
The table should be read as follows. The RENT scheme increased the probability of a lasting exit from unemployment 12 months after 
joining the scheme for the flow unemployed in the LIEC group by five percentage points compared to the control group.
Source: Sodie.
LIEC
3 months after entry°
Flow (14%) Stock (9%)
RENT PARI RENT PARI
0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.00
6 months after entry
Flow (22%) Stock (18%)
RENT PARI RENT PARI
0.04** 0.05** 0.02* 0.01
12 months after entry
Flow (31%) Stock (30%)
RENT PARI RENT PARI
0.05** 0.06*** –0.03 0.01
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While the jobseekers in the TRAJECTOIRE group then seem to have suffered 
more from this “neglect”, we do not actually find that caseworkers select those who 
are the least detached from the labour market in terms of their monthly placement 
engagements. If anything, the opposite holds, as can be seen from the use that the 
caseworkers in the PARI sites make of the individual score. From April 2011 onwards 
(and starting in February 2011 for half of the group), caseworkers in the PARI scheme 
were informed of the score of all jobseekers in their portfolio.22 This information 
changed the caseworkers’ selection with respect to their placement engagements: 
starting in February 2011, the average score of the selected jobseekers actually fell 
on average. This was also the case at each individual site. Once they were informed 
of the individual score, caseworkers thus deliberately selected jobseekers with less 
favourable observable characteristics.
Practical Lessons and the Potential Generalisation of the Results
The results of this experiment revealed that the RENT scheme leads to signifi-
cantly better outcomes in the sites in which it was applied. This is not particularly 
surprising as the combination of the better identification of job offers and greater effort 
in matching these to jobseekers should lead mechanically to higher exit rates. However, 
the generalisation of schemes like RENT, either in companies like Sodie or at a wider 
level in the Public Employment Agency, does pose the question of the cost-benefit ratio. 
The recruitment of new assistants and the operational costs of the scheme during the 
experiment, as well as the costs of replacing the assistants who quit the scheme, were 
22. This information was not given to caseworkers on RENT sites and in the control group until April.
TABLE 4 –  The Impact of the Schemes on the Probability of Leaving Unemployment for Work. 
Linear Probability Models
° Given the outcome variable, it should be noted that the stock population is likely heterogeneous, as it consists of individuals who 
were helped for between 0 and 3 months for the 3-month exit rate, and between 0 and 12 months for that at 12 months. This makes the 
comparison with the flow results more difficult.
Notes: *, **, *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. The standard errors are clustered at the site level.
The table should be read as follows. The RENT scheme increased the probability of a lasting exit from unemployment six months after 
joining the scheme for the flow unemployed in the TRAJECTOIRE group by three percentage points compared to the control group.
Source: Sodie.
TRAJECTOIRE
3 months after entry°
Flow (11%) Stock (9%)
RENT PARI RENT PARI
0.03** –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
6 months after entry
Flow (16%) Stock (13%)
RENT PARI RENT PARI
0.03** –0.02 –0.01 –0.02
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sufficiently costly to dissuade Sodie’s management from generalising this scheme to 
all sites at the end of the experimental period.
Despite this conclusion, it should be underlined that this evaluation, in both its 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions, did lead Sodie to change its practices in terms 
of collecting job offers. In the context of the qualitative survey, the detailed analysis 
of the activity of the caseworkers in charge of the identification and matching of job 
offers revealed that they considered that looking for job offers took up too much of 
their time, to the detriment of the analysis of jobseekers’ CVs and the matching of 
jobseekers to job offers. Inasmuch as there are a number of online recruitment services 
which currently provide the automated collection of a large number of job offers, 
Sodie’s management decided to enter into a partnership with one such provider in 
order to have access to its job offers.23 The aim here was to concentrate the work of 
the RENT caseworkers on the activity in which they were of the greatest value: the 
matching of job offers and CVs.
On the contrary, the financial potential of the PARI scheme, when correctly tar-
geted, is clearer. The associated costs are only small, apart from those associated with 
the follow-up of caseworkers’ monthly placement engagements by a coordinator who 
also chases up caseworkers who do not submit their engagements on time. As such, 
the success of the PARI scheme, even though it was limited to the LIEC group who 
had been laid-off, indicates that investments in innovative work methods can increase 
placement efficiency with an effect size of the same order as that of (more costly) 
intense counselling programmes. This is one of this article’s most important results. 
The limited resources of the Public Employment Agency in the context of budget cuts 
can be offset by systematic reflection regarding the work methods of caseworkers, 
followed by the general introduction of the practices with the best results.
We should however remain cautious about any generalisation of schemes similar 
to PARI. The qualitative survey run by Sodie underlined the tension that an obligation 
in terms of results and increasing caseloads put on caseworkers’ activities. This tension 
is shared by other private service providers, but also to a certain extent by caseworkers 
in the public sector. In this context, it may be difficult to manage, across decentralised 
sites, programmes with a considerable methodological component. In the PARI 
scheme, the requirement to make engagements and their follow-up were sometimes 
badly received by caseworkers. As such, rather than any accelerated general intro-
duction, the analysis of the practical difficulties encountered during the experiment 
argues for the organized permanent exchange of best practices. From this point of 
view, the experiment revealed different effects of the two schemes on the stock and 
flow unemployed, who likely have unemployment of different durations. The targeting 
of schemes at those who are most likely to profit from them, here those who have 
23. This partnership agreement was signed on the 10 December 2012 with the https://www.qapa.fr/ platform.
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been laid-off for the PARI scheme, would increase the efficiency of the counselling 
programmes.
•
This article presents the framework, method and results of a randomised exper-
iment carried out by a Private Placement Operator aimed at testing the effect of two 
innovative placement schemes on the exit rate from unemployment. The first (RENT) 
intensified job collection and matching activity, in order to increase the number of 
job offers proposed to jobseekers. This increased the placement rate, although the 
considerable associated costs would appear to be an obstacle to its more general intro-
duction. The second (PARI) consisted of a methodological aid given to caseworkers, 
by encouraging them to temporarily concentrate their efforts on a restricted group of 
jobseekers. This scheme, which is far less costly than the RENT scheme, also produced 
positive effects, but only on those who had been laid-off.
The research here contributes to the empirical literature on the efficiency of 
placement programmes for jobseekers from a relatively novel standpoint: that of the 
caseworkers who are in charge of placement, rather than the jobseekers themselves. 
The results reveal that providing support to caseworkers may be just as effective as 
increasing the resources allocated to the placement programme.
Future work in this area could extend these results in two different directions: 
first, by carrying out a formal cost-benefit analysis of the schemes taking into account 
the revenue generated for the private placement operator, part of which is conditional 
on results; second, by paying particular attention to the spillovers created by these 
schemes (positive spillovers from information circulation, or negative spillovers from 
the neglect of some jobseekers) using the data collected during the experiment that has 
not yet been exploited. In particular, the PARI scheme would appear to deserve more 
detailed investigation in order to understand the changes in caseworkers behaviour, 
notably when these latter are provided with jobseekers’ profiling scores.
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